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Most analyses of the U.S. Great Moderation have been based on VAR methods, and have
consistently pointed toward good luck as the main explanation for the greater macroeconomic
stability of recent years. Using data generated by a New-Keynesian model in which the only
source of change is the move from passive to active monetary policy, we show that VARs may
misinterpret good policy for good luck. In particular, we detect signi￿cant breaks in estimated
VAR innovation variances, although in the data generating process the volatilities of the structural
shocks are constant across policy regimes. Counterfactual simulations, structural and
reduced-form, point toward the incorrect conclusion of good luck. Our results cast doubts on the
existing notion that VAR evidence is inconsistent with the good policy explanation of the Great
Moderation.
Key words: Great in￿ation, passive policy, break tests, vector autoregressions.
JEL classi￿cation: E38, E52.
4Summary
Post-WWII U.S. economic history is usually divided into two distinct periods. The ￿rst period,
which extends up to the end of the Volcker disin￿ation around the mid-1980s, is characterised by
macroeconomic turbulence, with highly volatile output growth, and highly volatile and persistent
in￿ation. The most recent period, from the end of the Volcker disin￿ation to the present day, is
marked, in contrast, by signi￿cantly smaller volatilities of both in￿ation and output growth and,
possibly, by a lower extent of in￿ation persistence. These dramatic changes in the reduced-form
properties of the U.S. economy over the last several decades are known as the ‘Great Moderation’.
A vast empirical literature has investigated the source(s) of the Great Moderation in an attempt to
disentangle the relative contributions of two main explanations: good policy and good luck. The
good luck hypothesis has been advocated by studies based on Vector AutoRegression (VAR)
methods. The good policy hypothesis has been, in contrast, advocated by studies based on
estimated sticky-price models in which monetary policy is allowed to switch from passive (i.e.
weakly reactive to in￿ation) to active (i.e. strongly reactive to in￿ation).
This paper tries to reconcile the con￿icting results of the two strands of the literature by asking
whether the differences in the methods between the two approaches can account for the
differences in the results. To investigate the ability of VARs to identify the sources of the Great
Moderation, we use as data generation process a standard sticky-price New Keynesian model in
which the only source of change is the move from passive to active monetary policy.
We simulate the model under both policy regimes and apply widely used reduced-form and
structural estimation techniques on the simulated data. Can VAR methods uncover the good policy
explanation that we have constructed? The answer is ‘No’. In particular, we ￿nd that: (i) estimated
VAR innovation variances exhibit large and signi￿cant instability across policy regimes, even in
the absence, by construction, of any change in the volatilities of the structural shocks in the data
generating process. VAR coef￿cients, on the other hand, exhibit signi￿cant instability only in the
interest rate equation; (ii) counterfactual simulations ￿both structural and reduced-form￿
strongly point towards the incorrect conclusion that monetary policy played no role.
It is worth emphasising that earlier contributions have concluded that good luck has been the
5driving force of the Great Moderation on the basis of this kind of ￿ndings. Results very similar to
those obtained on actual data are produced, in this paper, within a framework in which the change
in macroeconomic dynamics is driven exclusively by improved monetary policy.
We identify two main dimensions along which VAR results can be misleading. First, changes in
the monetary policy rule of the structural model have an impact on both the covariance matrix and
the coef￿cients of the VAR representation of the structural model. In particular, the impact of the
policy shift on the VAR covariance matrix can dominate the impact on the VAR coef￿cients.
Previous literature, however, has routinely interpreted changes in the volatilities of the VAR
innovations as evidence against good policy and in favour of good luck. Second, changes in the
interest rate equation of a structural VAR bear no clear-cut relationship with changes in the
parameters of the monetary policy rule of the underlying structural model. Earlier contributions, in
contrast, have performed counterfactual simulations in structural VARs under the presumption that
switching the estimated coef￿cients of the interest rate equations provides a reasonable
approximation to switching the parameters of the monetary policy rule in the underlying structural
model.
61 Introduction
Post-WWII U.S. economic history is usually divided into two distinct periods. The ￿rst period,
which extends up to the end of the Volcker disin￿ation around the mid-1980s, is characterised by
macroeconomic turbulence, with highly volatile output growth, and highly volatile and persistent
in￿ation. The most recent period, from the end of the Volcker disin￿ation to the present day, is
marked, in contrast, by signi￿cantly smaller volatilities of both in￿ation and output growth and,
possibly, by a lower extent of in￿ation persistence.(1) These dramatic changes in the reduced-form
properties of the U.S. economy over the last several decades are known as the ‘Great
Moderation’.(2)
A vast empirical literature has investigated the source(s) of the Great Moderation in an attempt to
disentangle the relative contributions of two main explanations: good policy and good luck. Based
on (time-varying) structural VAR methods, the good luck hypothesis has been advocated by a
number of authors including Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Canova and Gambetti
(2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006) for the U.S., and Benati
(2007) for the U.K.. Based on an estimated sticky-price model of the U.S. economy, Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) ￿nd, in contrast, support for the good policy explanation advocated by
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), according to which a shift in the systematic component of
monetary policy has been the driving force behind the recent macroeconomic stability.
This paper tries to reconcile the con￿icting results of the two strands of the literature by asking
whether the differences in the methods between the two approaches can account for the
differences in the results. To investigate the ability of VARs to identify the sources of the Great
Moderation, we use as data generation process a standard sticky-price New Keynesian model in
which the only source of change is the move from passive to active monetary policy.(3)
We simulate the model under both policy regimes and apply widely used reduced-form and
structural estimation techniques on the simulated data. Can VAR methods uncover the good policy
explanation that we have constructed? The answer is ‘No’. In particular, we ￿nd that:
(1) The decline in in￿ation persistence is still a contentious issue in empirical macroeconomics￿see eg Kim,
Nelson, and Piger (2004), Cogley and Sargent (2002) and Cogley and Sargent (2005), on the one hand, and Stock
(2002) for an opposite point of view.
(2) See Kim and Nelson (1999) and McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000).
(3) As we abstract from the role of ￿scal policy, the relationship between the monetary policy stance and equilibrium
(in)determinacy in a plain New-Keynesian model is one-to-one, with a passive (active) rule associated with an
indeterminate (determinate) equilibrium. As shown by Leeper (1991), in more complex settings this is not the case.
7￿ Based on bootstrapped critical values, estimated VAR innovation variances exhibit large and
signi￿cant instability across policy regimes, even in the absence, by construction, of any change
in the volatilities of the structural shocks in the data generating process. VAR coef￿cients, on
the other hand, exhibit signi￿cant instability only in the interest rate equation.
￿ Counterfactual simulations ￿both structural and reduced-form￿ strongly point towards the
incorrect conclusion that monetary policy played no role.
It is worth emphasising that earlier contributions have concluded that good luck has been the
driving force of the Great Moderation on the basis of this kind of ￿ndings. Results very similar to
those obtained on actual data are produced, in this paper, within a framework in which the change
in macroeconomic dynamics is driven exclusively by improved monetary policy.
We identify two main dimensions along which VAR results can be misleading. First, changes in
the monetary policy rule of the DSGE model have an impact on both the covariance matrix and
the coef￿cients of the VAR representation of the model. In particular, the impact of the policy shift
on the VAR covariance matrix can dominate the impact on the VAR coef￿cients. Previous
literature, however, has routinely interpreted changes in the volatilities of the VAR innovations as
evidence against good policy and in favour of good luck. Second, changes in the interest rate
equation of a structural VAR bear no clear-cut relationship with changes in the parameters of the
monetary policy rule of the underlying DSGE model. Earlier contributions, in contrast, have
performed counterfactual simulations in structural VARs under the presumption that switching the
estimated coef￿cients of the interest rate equations provides a reasonable approximation to
switching the parameters of the monetary policy rule in the underlying DSGE model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 compares, for the United Kingdom, the results from
Bayesian time-varying parameter structural VARs with results coming from a more traditional
‘narrative-historical’ approach. The U.K. experience is particularly interesting here because,
different from the U.S., narrative evidence strongly suggest that improved monetary policy played
a signi￿cant role in fostering the recent macroeconomic stability, whereas the VAR evidence
strongly supports the notion of a more favourable macroeconomic environment in the form of
smaller shocks. Section 3 outlines the strategy of our experiment, brie￿y describes the standard
New Keynesian sticky-price model and then motivates our focus on the position of Clarida, Gal￿,
and Gertler (2000). Section 4 presents results based on reduced-form methods. In Section 5, we
estimate structural VARs based on the simulated data, identifying the structural shocks via the sign
8restrictions implied by the New Keynesian model. In Section 6, we investigate some of the
reasons why structural VAR methods have dif￿culty uncovering the true source of changes in the
data generating process. Section 7 concludes.
2 The U.K. experience
The literature on the Great Moderation has been dominated, so far, by a strictly econometric
approach based on either reduced-form techniques, as in Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), or on
structural methods, as in Primiceri (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha
(2006). But econometric evidence is not the only kind of evidence we can rely on.
Historical and ‘narrative’ evidence, which for instance details the evolution of the intellectual
climate surrounding monetary policymaking, may provide useful insights into the relative merits
of ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ as the driving force of the recent macroeconomic stability.(4)
While for the United States narrative accounts of the Great In￿ation and the subsequent
stabilisation do not seem to provide decisive evidence in favour of either hypothesis ￿see for
instance DeLong (1997)￿, evidence for the United Kingdom is strong.
2.1 From ‘in￿ation as a nonmonetary phenomenon’ to the Monetary Policy Committee
In their extensive analysis of the broad intellectual climate surrounding monetary policymaking in
the United Kingdom during the 1960s and 1970s, Nelson and Nikolov (2004) point out that
[m]onetary policy was not seen as essential for in￿ation control; the latter, instead, was largely
delegated to incomes policy (wage and price controls). [...] Essentially, UK policymakers viewed
monetary policy as disconnected from in￿ation for two reasons. First, in￿ation was perceived as
largely driven by factors other than the output gap; secondly, policymakers were highly sceptical about
the ability of monetary policy to affect aggregate demand or the output gap appreciably. [This] led to a
combination of easy monetary policy and attempts to control in￿ation through other devices, and
contributed heavily to the breakout of in￿ation in the 1960s and 1970s.
(emphasis added)
Similar views have been expressed by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, in his
re￿ections on the evolution of macroeconomic thinking and monetary policymaking in the United
(4) For more technically oriented readers, who may be tempted to dismiss such arguments, it is worth noting that
Monetary History by Friedman and Schwartz was entirely based on the narrative approach and that it has been one of
the most in￿uential macroeconomic books of the XX century. For a more recent example of such an approach, see
Romer and Romer (2002).
9Kingdom since the 1960s ￿see King (2005).
From the end of the second world war until the mid to late 1970s, the majority view of [U.K.] academic
economists and policy-makers alike was that monetary policy had rather little to do with in￿ation, and
was largely ineffective as an instrument of demand management. [...] Fortunately, the theory and
practice of monetary policy in the UK have changed out of all recognition in the past twenty-￿ve years.
These assessments can be supported by those involved at policy over the time. For example,
Nicholas Kaldor (1971), then adviser to Harold Wilson, stated that
[i]t is also far more generally acknowledged￿even by Conservative Prime Ministers￿that the process
of in￿ation is cost-induced and not demand-induced, with the evident implication that it can be tackled
only by an incomes policy.(5)
Along similar lines, Alec Cairncross (1996), who served as a Treasury of￿cial(6) during that
period, provides a view consistent with the position of Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and King
(2005):
[i]n the effort to limit in￿ation there was little thought of reliance on monetary policy, much less
exclusive reliance on monetary policy [...]. The prevailing view was that of the Radcliffe Committee
[...]: monetary policy itself had limited usefulness in controlling in￿ation. [...] Even after the IMF
seminar in 1968, the Treasury remained sceptical [...] of the in￿uence of monetary policy on the rate of
in￿ation, and was anxious to keep rates as low as possible in the interests of holding down interest on
government debt and encouraging ￿xed investment.(7) (emphasis added)
The intellectual foundation of this position was the Report of the Radcliffe Commission (1959),
the manifesto of post-WWII U.K. Keynesianism. In the words of Batini and Nelson (2005)
[...] the Report’s view of the transmission mechanism was inconsistent with assigning any important
macroeconomic role for monetary policy, not just a framework that emphasises monetary aggregates.
Thus the implication of its analysis was not a preference for a Wicksellian analysis of price-level
determination over a quantity-oriented approach, but a rejection of both these perspectives due to its
conclusion that aggregate demand (let alone the price level) was out of reach of monetary policy
actions. (emphasis added)
(5) As quoted by King (2005).
(6) Until May 1997, U.K. monetary policy had been formulated by the Treasury. For a brief history of U.K. monetary
arrangements, see Benati (2006, section 2).
(7) As quoted by Nelson and Nikolov (2004).
10The Radcliffe Report conclusion was that ‘there can be no reliance on [interest rate policy] as a
major short-term stabiliser of demand’. This position was re￿ected in several statements by U.K.
policymakers of the 1960s and 1970s quoted by Nelson and Nikolov (2004) and Batini and Nelson
(2005). The former, for example, quote Edward Heath, Prime Minister between 1970 and 1974, as
rejecting tout court any notion of a link between money growth ￿in the speci￿c case, M1￿ and
in￿ation.
Over the last several decades, however, the United Kingdom has moved from a situation in which
monetary policy was regarded as unsuited to controlling in￿ation, to one in which, on the contrary,
it is regarded as the crucial instrument. Moreover, the change in the overall intellectual attitude
towards in￿ation and monetary policy has been enshrined in the U.K. monetary framework with
the introduction of in￿ation targeting in October 1992, the independence of the Bank of England
and the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee in May 1997.
2.2 Results from time-varying parameters structural VARs
The dramatic changes in both macroeconomic thinking and monetary policymaking since the
beginning of the 1960s suggest that econometric analyses of the U.K. post-WWII period should
point towards good policy as the main explanation of the Great Moderation. In fact, this is not the
case. Benati (2007) ￿ts a Bayesian time-varying parameters structural VAR with stochastic
volatility to U.K. GDP growth, GDP de￿ator in￿ation, money growth, and a short-term rate.
Consistent with the ￿ndings of Stock and Watson (2002), Primiceri (2005), Gambetti, Pappa, and
Canova (2006) and Sims and Zha (2006) for the United States, his results strongly point towards
good luck as the driving force of the recent macroeconomic stability in the United Kingdom, with
only a minimal role played by improved monetary policy.
In principle, it is possible to entertain the position that changing in macroeconomic thinking and
changing in macroeconomic dynamics has just been a lucky coincidence. On the basis of the
narrative evidence available for the U.K., however, we ￿nd it hard to believe that the
improvements in monetary policy making played no role at all in fostering macroeconomic
stability. The inconsistency between narrative and empirical evidence poses a serious challenge
for the ability of VAR methods to assess the relative merits of the good luck and good policy
explanations of the Great Moderation.
113 Assessing VAR studies of the Great Moderation
Our goal is to assess the ability of VAR analyses to determine the role that monetary policy played
in a speci￿c historical episode, the Great Moderation. To this end, we design the following
experiment:
Suppose that the Great Moderation in the United States, for instance, was due exclusively to
monetary policy, with a passive policy regime in place before October 1979 and an active policy
regime in place after. Would (structural) VARs be capable of uncovering the data generating
process?
As we will see, the answer is ‘No’. When applied to a data generation process (henceforth, DGP)
which, by construction, switches from passive to active monetary policy, structural VAR methods
strongly point towards good luck as the explanation for the changes in the DGP.
3.1 A model for monetary policy analysis
We use the standard New Keynesian sticky-price model surveyed by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(1999) and Woodford (2003). In spite of its ‘bare bones’ structure, there are several reasons for
preferring this model to more sophisticated ones (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007) or Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)). In particular, its simplicity allows us to highlight the conceptual
issues involved in the present exercise, without the unnecessary complications of more complex
structures. Such a simplicity makes it possible to obtain analytical solutions under both policy
regimes. This is particularly important for the case of passive policy, as it eliminates the need to
resort to the approximated numerical solution described in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004).(8)
The model is given by
xt D xtC1jt ￿ ￿.Rt ￿ ￿tC1jt/ C gt (1)
￿t D ￿￿tC1jt C ￿xt C ut (2)
Rt D ￿RRt￿1 C .1 ￿ ￿R/[￿￿￿t C ￿xxt] C ￿R;t (3)
gt D ￿ggt￿1 C ￿g;t and ut D ￿zut￿1 C ￿z;t (4)
(8) Under the passive policy regime, we follow Lubik and Schorfheide (2003 and 2004) and we solve the model
under the assumption that the impulse-response functions do not change discontinuously at the boundary between
active and passive regions. This solution is labelled continuity.
12where xt, ￿t, Rt, gt, and ut are the output gap, in￿ation, the interest rate, a demand disturbance,
and a cost push shock. The output gap is de￿ned as the difference between output and the level
consistent with ￿exible prices. All variables are expressed as log-deviations from a non-stochastic
steady-state.
With a few exceptions discussed below, our calibration of the parameters of the model closely
follows Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000). Speci￿cally, we set ￿ D 0:99, ￿ D 0:3, and ￿ D 1. The
parameters of the monetary policy rule are the ‘baseline estimates’ reported in Table II of Clarida,
Gali, and Gertler (2000): ￿￿ D 2:15, ￿x D 0:93, and ￿R D 0:79 for the active regime, and
￿￿ D 0:83, ￿x D 0:1, and ￿R D 0:68 for the passive regime.(9) As Clarida, Gali, and Gertler
(2000) do not report estimates for the remaining structural parameters, we set ￿g D ￿u D 0:9, and
the standard deviations of the structural shocks to ￿ g D ￿u D 1, and ￿ R D 0:25. Together with the
structural parameters, the passive (active) policy implies indeterminacy (determinacy) in the
former (latter) regime. In order to make our results as transparent as possible, under the passive
regime we set the variance of sunspot shocks to zero.
3.2 Modelling the policy shift
In the controlled experiment, we design a decline in macroeconomic volatilities that is driven
exclusively by a change in the systematic component of monetary policy. In contrast, the standard
deviations of the structural innovations, including the policy shocks, are kept constant across
regimes. In the jargon of the literature on the Great Moderation, we are thus constructing a world
of ‘bad policy’ before October 1979, and ‘good policy’ after 1982.(10) The question we then ask
is: are VAR methods capable of uncovering the ‘truth’ that we have constructed?
Our focus on the policy regime shift advocated by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and Lubik and
Schorfheide (2004) is motivated by two main considerations. First, the dichotomy active-passive
policy allows a researcher to de￿ne the notion of ‘bad policy’ in a precise and meaningful way.
Within the active policy region, in fact, the modelling choice is limited, at the very best, between
good policy and slightly better policy. Second, as we will show in Section 4, the move from
(9) According to Table II in Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), under the passive regime the parameter ￿x should in
fact be 0:27. This is the only departure from their ‘baseline estimates’. Setting ￿x in the passive regime to the value in
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) implies that the impact of a cost-push shock on the output gap would have different
signs under the two regimes, and therefore it would create an obvious problem for the implementation of the sign
restrictions method in Section 5. The problem disappears, however, setting ￿x D 0:1 in the passive regime.
(10)As for the UK, Benati (2006) dates the break in in￿ation and output dynamics around 1992. For an assessment of
the UK macroeconomic policy and economic performance from the 1950s up to the mid-1990s see Sentance (1998).
13passive to active policy can indeed generate a sizable fall in macroeconomic volatility such as to
replicate the key qualitative features of the Great Moderation.(11)
We present estimates based on 10,000 simulations of the model under both the active and passive
policy regimes. The only exception is represented by the tests for structural breaks at unknown
points in the sample for both the VAR innovation variances and the coef￿cients of the VAR
equations, which being based on bootstrapped critical values are computationally very intensive.
In this case, and only in this case, results are based on 1,000 simulations and, for each simulation,
the number of bootstrap replications is also set to 1,000. The sample length is set to T D 100
under both regimes.(12)
4 Reduced-form evidence
Instability of estimated innovation variances in (Markov-switching or time-varying parameters)
VARs has been interpreted, so far, as strong evidence in favour of good luck and against good
policy. In this section, we investigate the extent to which this interpretation is warranted. For the
two policy regimes, the Panel (a) of Figure 1 plots the distributions of the estimated VAR total
prediction variances while panels (b) to (d) plot the distributions of the estimated volatilities of the
reduced-form innovations to the three VAR equations.(13)
In spite of the fact that the volatilities of the structural innovations are kept constant in the DSGE
model, both the total prediction variance and the volatilities of the innovations to the in￿ation and
output gap equations in the VAR exhibit a remarkable instability across policy regimes. The
evidence for the interest rate equation is weaker, although it is still apparent. A signi￿cant decline
in estimated VAR innovation variances is compatible with the notion that, under the earlier
regime, a series of relatively large shocks hit the economy whereas, during the latter regime, the
macroeconomic environment became more benign. Although such interpretation is standard in the
literature, our simple example shows that also a shift from passive to active policy can replicate
the instability of estimated innovation variances typically found in VAR analyses.
(11)If policy shifts are modelled as stochastic, Davig and Leeper (2007), and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2006)
show that the mapping between policy activism and equilibrium determinacy becomes more complex. Interestingly,
however, a move from passive to active policy is still capable of replicating the Great Moderation in their settings.
(12)In order to reduce as much as possible dependence from the initial conditions, we run a 100 periods long
‘pre-simulation’, which we then discard.
(13)The total prediction variance of a VAR is a simple measure of the total amount of noise hitting the system at each
point in time, and it is de￿ned as ln[det(V)], where V is the covariance matrix of the VAR innovations. The lag orders
of the VARs have been selected via the AIC.
14As changes in the distributions of the estimated innovation variances to the in￿ation and output
gap equations are large, formal tests should point towards statistical breaks. The ￿rst two columns
of Table 1 report, for each of the three equations of the VAR, the medians of the bootstrapped
p-values distributions of a Wald test for a single break across regimes in either the innovation
variance, or the coef￿cients of the equation. The table also displays the 5th and 95th percentiles of
the bootstrapped distributions.(14) Consistent with the ￿nding of Figure 1, evidence of breaks in
the innovation variance is very strong for both in￿ation and the output gap, while it is weak for the
interest rate. Interestingly, results for the equation coef￿cients are exactly the opposite, with
strong evidence of breaks in the interest rate equation, and very weak evidence of breaks in the
other two equations.
It is worth emphasising that earlier contributions have found, on actual data, results that are
qualitatively very similar to the results, on simulated data, shown in Table 1. Sims and Zha (2006),
for instance, report that ‘the best ￿t [of the VAR] is with a version that allows time variation in
structural disturbance variances only. Among versions that allow for changes in equation
coef￿cients also, the best ￿t is for a one that allows coef￿cients to change only in the monetary
policy rule.’ While earlier contributions have interpreted these results as evidence in favour of the
good luck hypothesis, the instability of VAR innovation variances presented in Table 1 has been
obtained within a framework in which improved monetary policy is the only driver of the Great
Moderation.
The last two columns of Table 1 display results for a policy shift within the active regime.(15) A
move to a relatively more anti-in￿ationary policy stance, within the active regime, is still capable
of producing statistically signi￿cant breaks in the estimated innovation variances to in￿ation and
output gap equations. The evidence of instability for both the innovation variance in the interest
rate equation and the VAR coef￿cients is, once again, much weaker. The result that the VAR
detects the shift in monetary policy as a break in the error variances does not hinge then on the
move from passive to active policy.
Our reduced-form results show that, in contrast to the conventional presumption, the policy shift
can exert its maximal impact on the VAR covariance matrix, as opposed to the VAR coef￿cients.
It should be noted, however, that our results do not imply that we should now replace the previous,
mistaken presumption with the opposite presumption that a change in the policy rule will always
(14)Bootstrapping is performed as in Diebold and Chen (1996) applied to the VAR as a whole.
(15)Speci￿cally, we increase ￿￿ from 1:1 to 1:8 while keeping ￿R and ￿x constant to 0:9 and 0:5.
15exert its maximal impact on the VAR covariance matrix. Rather, our ￿ndings imply that the
evidence on instability of VAR innovation variances should be regarded as uninformative for
discriminating between luck and policy.
Moving to counterfactual simulations, Stock and Watson (2002) and Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson
(2004) show that switching the estimated VAR equation coef￿cients between the two sub-periods
produces little change in the volatilities of the series. Switching the estimated volatilities of the
reduced-form disturbances, in contrast, ‘inverts’ the outcomes with the macroeconomic stability
now taking place over the ￿rst part of the sample. Table 2 reports the medians of the distributions
of the standard deviations of the series, together with the 5th and 95th percentiles. Results are
displayed for the baseline simulation under the active and passive regimes, and for counterfactual
simulations in which we bootstrap the estimated reduced-form VARs after switching the estimated
residuals across the two sub-periods.
A switch in the estimated reduced-form shocks across sub-periods inverts the ￿nal outcome, thus
replicating the ￿ndings of Stock and Watson (2002) and Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004) on
actual data. In particular, super-imposing the reduced-form disturbances of the active period onto
the estimates of the VAR coef￿cients for the passive sub-sample generates a substantial reduction
in the volatilities of the three series. Analogously, coupling the VAR shocks of the passive period
with the VAR coef￿cients estimated for the active regime moves macroeconomic volatility from
the former to the latter period.
The ￿ndings of this section pose a serious challenge for the ability of existing reduced-form VAR
evidence to assessing the role that monetary policy played in the Great Moderation. Conclusions
that appear, at ￿rst sight, entirely sensible and appealing, turn out to be, upon closer inspection,
potentially fragile. But, are structural methods any better?
5 Structural evidence
On the basis of either time-varying or Markov-switching structural VARs for the United States,
several authors have shown that switching monetary rules across sub-periods would have made
little difference to the macroeconomic outcomes over the post-WWII era. This result has been
interpreted as evidence against good policy, and in favour of good luck. In this section, we show
that very similar results are obtained within a framework in which everything is driven by a move
from passive to active policy.
165.1 Identi￿cation
The calibration of the parameters of the model implies impulse-response functions (henceforth,
IRFs) for which the impact of the structural shocks on the three variables has the same sign under
both active and passive regimes. In what follows, we identify therefore the three structural shocks
in the VAR by imposing the following contemporaneous sign restrictions:
￿ a positive monetary policy shock has a positive impact on the interest rate, and a negative
impact on in￿ation and the output gap;
￿ a positive demand non-policy shock has a positive impact on all variables;
￿ a positive cost push shock has a positive impact on in￿ation and the interest rate, and a negative
impact on the output gap.
For each of the 10,000 simulations under either the active or passive regime we estimate a
reduced-form VAR as in section 4, selecting the lag order on the basis of the Akaike information
criterion. We compute the structural impact matrix, A0, via the procedure recently introduced by
Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and Zha (2005).(16) Speci￿cally, let ￿ D P ￿ D ￿ P0 be the
eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the estimated VAR covariance matrix ￿, and let
Q A0 ￿ P ￿ D
1
2. We draw an N ￿ N matrix, K, from the N(0, 1) distribution, we take the QR
decomposition of K￿that is, we compute matrices Q and R such that K=Q ￿ R￿and we
compute the structural impact matrix as A0= Q A0 ￿ Q0. Following Rubio-Ramirez, Waggoner, and
Zha (2005), for each of the 10,000 simulations, we keep on drawing (i.e. computing rotations)
until the sign restrictions are satis￿ed.
Given our calibration, we regard our choice of imposing the sign restrictions implied by the model
as the most natural one. Other identifying restrictions, as for instance Cholesky, suffer from the
notable drawback of being false under both policy regimes, and therefore they would make it
dif￿cult to interpret the results.
(16)See http://home.earthlink.net/~tzha02/ProgramCode/SRestrictRWZalg.m.
175.2 Counterfactual simulations
VARs have been applied to U.S. in￿ation, unemployment, and a short rate. Primiceri (2005), for
example, ‘brings Greenspan back in time’ by drawing the parameters of the monetary rule from
their 1991-1992 posterior distribution, and imposing them over the entire sample period. His
result of virtually no difference between the median of the distributions of counterfactual and
actual series of unemployment and in￿ation is interpreted as prima facie evidence in favour of
good luck, and against good policy.
Canova and Gambetti (2005) perform an alternative counterfactual exercise for the U.S. economy
and they increase the estimated posterior mean of the coef￿cient on in￿ation in their time-varying
VAR monetary rule by two standard deviations. As they stress, ‘[a] permanent more aggressive
stance would have had important in￿ation effects in 1979, primarily in the medium run. However,
at all dates in the 1980s and 1990s, the effect would have been statistically negligible.’ These
results favour, apparently, the good luck hypothesis.
We simulate the model 10,000 times under both active and passive regimes, and for each
simulation we proceed as follows: (i) based on the two simulated samples, we estimate two
structural VARs as described in Section 5.1; (ii) we switch the estimated structural monetary rules
in the two VARs across sub-periods, keeping everything else constant; (iii) we feed the estimated
structural shocks to the VARs and we generate counterfactual series for the interest rate, in￿ation
and the output gap;(17) (iv) we regress each of the ‘true’ simulated series on the corresponding
counterfactual series via OLS, and we store the R2.
To assess the ability of VAR counterfactual simulations to detect a break in the policy rule of the
DSGE model, we also construct a benchmark R2. For each simulation, we add two further steps:
(v) we feed the ‘true’ structural shocks of one policy regime to the DSGE model calibrated for the
other regime, and we generate counterfactual series for the interest rate, in￿ation and the output
gap; (vi) we regress the ‘true’ series simulated using the structural macro model on the
counterfactual series via OLS, and we store the R2. It should be noted that the steps (v)-(vi) in the
DSGE model are, conceptually, the counterparts of the steps (iii)-(iv) in the VAR, and therefore
they will be used to construct the benchmark R2.
(17)For each counterfactual simulation we take as the initial conditions the ￿rst p values of Yt ￿ [Rt, ￿t, xt]0, where
p is the lag order selected by the AIC.
18As the OLS regressions do no contain a constant, a R2 of one implies that ‘true’ and
counterfactual series are identical, so that switching the monetary rules in either the estimated
structural VARs or the DSGE model causes no change in the series. The lower the R2, on the other
hand, the greater are the changes implied by the switch in policy. More importantly, if VAR
counterfactual simulations were a reasonable approximation to the switch in the DSGE model,
then the distributions of the two R2 for VAR and DSGE model should be reasonably similar.
For each regime and variable, Figure 2 reports two objects: (in black) the distributions of the R2
for the regression of the ‘true’ in￿ation, output and interest rate on the counterfactual series in the
VAR, and (in red) the distributions associated with the ‘true’ and counterfactual series in the
DSGE model.
A number of interesting results emerges from Figure 2. First, the distributions implied by the
VARs are always skewed relative to the distributions implied by the DSGE model, both for the
passive (top row) and the active regime (bottom row). Second, for in￿ation and the interest rate,
the modes of the R2 distributions of the DSGE model are far below the modes associated with the
VAR, implying that the differences in the DGP are far larger than the differences detected by the
counterfactual VARs. As for the output gap in the passive regime, the largest difference between
‘true’ and counterfactual series is now associated with the VAR. The distance between the modes,
however, is still large, and it implies that the counterfactual simulations do not uncover the ‘true’
change in the DGP. Third, and more generally, imposing the structural monetary rule estimated for
one regime onto the VAR estimated for the other regime produces limited changes in the
counterfactual series. For in￿ation and the interest rate, the mode of the R2 distributions is one
under both regimes, and the mass beyond 0:8 is above 50%.
Figure 3 complements the evidence in Figure 2 reporting the distributions of the standard
deviation of the interest rate, in￿ation, and the output gap in the baseline VARs (black lines,
labelled as ‘true’), and the distributions of the standard deviation for the three series based on the
counterfactual simulations (red lines, labelled as ‘counterfactual’). While switching the estimated
monetary rules between sub-periods produces some changes in the modes and distributions of the
volatilities of the series, the evidence in Figure 2 suggests that the counterfactual VARs capture
only a limited portion of the change implied by the policy switch in the DSGE model.
It is worth emphasising that earlier contributions obtain similar results performing, on actual data,
the kind of counterfactual experiments we have reported in Figure 2. The results of the
19counterfactual experiments have been interpreted, so far, as supportive of the good luck
hypothesis. As the data generating process, here, only features improved monetary policy, our
counterfactual simulations cast some doubts on the conventional interpretation of existing VAR
evidence.
5.3 Impulse-response analysis
Little change over time in estimated impulse-response functions to an identi￿ed monetary policy
shock has been traditionally regarded as evidence in favour of good luck and against good policy.
Figure 4 shows the distributions of the estimated IRFs to a unitary monetary shock for the interest
rate, in￿ation, and the output gap, based on 10,000 simulations of the model under both regimes.
We ￿nd little change in the distribution of the interest rate IRFs, some change for in￿ation, and a
marked change for the output gap. Overall, the evidence in Figure 4 does not point decisively
towards either luck or policy as the underlying cause of the Great Moderation. Together with the
results in the previous sections, however, this evidence would hardly induce a researcher to
identify the correct conclusion that policy is behind the changes in the DGP.(18)
6 Why do VARs miss the truth?
The results discussed in the previous sections provide an assessment of the ability of one of the
best available econometric methods to identify correctly the underlying causes of the Great
Moderation. Based on the New Keynesian workhorse model and a standard calibration as in
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), reduced-form evidence on the simulated data appear
uninformative and structural VARs seem to offer a distorted picture.
In this section, we explore why VARs are not capturing the truth. In order to identify the source of
the problem, we inspect the VAR representations implied by the New Keynesian model under the
two regimes.
(18)A previous version of the paper based on the model estimated by Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) still produced the
two key results of (i) statistically signi￿cant breaks in the VAR estimated innovation variances, and (ii) counterfactual
simulations pointing against policy as the underlying cause of the changes in the DGP. Further, that calibration also
produced little changes in the distributions of estimated IRFs to a unitary monetary shocks.
206.1 Mapping the structural model into a VAR
We solve the model as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). To this end, we de￿ne the state vector as
￿t ￿ [Rt, ￿t, xt, ￿tC1jt, xtC1jt, gt, zt]0, the vector of structural shocks as ￿t ￿ [￿R;t;￿g;t;￿z;t]0, and
the vector of forecast errors as ￿t ￿ [￿￿
t , ￿x
t ]0, where ￿￿
t ￿ ￿t-￿tjt￿1 and ￿x
t ￿ xt-xtjt￿1.
Augmenting (1)-(4) with the identities
￿t D ￿tjt￿1 C ￿
￿
t (5)
xt D xtjt￿1 C ￿
x
t (6)
the model can then be put into the canonical form due to Sims (2002):
00￿t D 01￿t￿1 C 9￿t C 5￿t (7)
where 00, 01, 9 and 5 are matrices conformable to ￿t, ￿t and ￿t. As shown by Lubik and
Schorfheide (2003), under both determinacy and indeterminacy the vector of forecast errors can
be expressed as a function of the vector of the structural shocks, which implies, under both
regimes, a VAR(1) representation for ￿t,
￿t D A￿t￿1 C B￿t (8)
The state-space representation of the model in terms of the three observable variables, Rt, ￿t, xt,
implies the following observation equation
Yt D C￿t (9)
with Yt ￿ [Rt, ￿t, xt]0 and C=[I3 03￿4]. Notice that, in terms of the canonical ‘A-B-C-D’
representation of a state-space form, the matrix D D 03￿3.
We compute an equivalent minimal state realisation (henceforth, EMSR) of (8)-(9) via the
MATLAB routine ss.m, and then we use a MATLAB code kindly supplied by Federico Ravenna
for computing the ￿nite-order VAR representation of a state-space form. Under the passive












































21A comparison between (10) and (11) provides additional insights into our results. It is intuitive to
think that changes in the monetary policy rule of a DSGE model should exert their maximal
impact on the coef￿cients of the VAR representation, with only a minimal impact on the VAR
covariance matrix. Inspection of (10) and (11), however, reveals that such intuition is incorrect.
The change in the systematic component of monetary policy from the passive to the active regime
has two consequences. First, and as expected, it causes changes in the AR matrix of the VAR.
Second, and more strikingly, the policy move induces a dramatic decline in the innovation
variances for two out of three series. In particular, the innovation variance of reduced-form shocks
to the in￿ation equation decreases by 65:1%, while the fall for the corresponding variance of the
output gap equation is equal to 84:1%. The VAR total prediction variance decreases by 42:1%, a
‘Great Moderation’ indeed.
These ￿gures cast serious doubts on the presumption that changes in the systematic component of
monetary policy should manifest themselves mostly as changes in the VAR coef￿cients. On the
basis of this presumption, results from earlier contributions have been interpreted according to the
notion that strong evidence of breaks in the VAR innovation variances, coupled with weak or no
evidence of breaks in the VAR coef￿cients, is evidence against policy and in favour of luck. As
(10) and (11) show, however, changes in the policy rule affect the entire structure of the VAR
representation of a structural macro model, exerting an impact on both coef￿cients and covariance
matrix. And, the presumption that the dominant impact of a policy shift will be on the VAR
coef￿cients appears unwarranted.
The numerical values in (10) and (11) also provide a rationale for the ￿nding of the reduced-form
counterfactual simulations reported in Section 4. As the policy shift exerts its main in￿uence on
the VAR covariance matrices, it does not come as surprise that switching the VAR residuals across
regimes ‘inverts’ the ￿nal outcome, with the Great Moderation now taking place in the former
period.
6.2 Counterfactual simulations: VAR vs. DSGE model
A switch between the monetary rules in the structural VARs appears to bear no clear-cut
relationship with a switch between the Taylor rules associated with passive and active regimes in
the DSGE model. With the bene￿t of hindsight, this is not surprising, as the coef￿cients of the
structural monetary rule￿and, more generally, of any equation in a VAR￿are complicated,
22non-linear functions of the structural parameters of the DSGE model. As a consequence,
switching the monetary rules in the VAR is not equivalent to switching the values of ￿￿, ￿x, and
￿R across the policy regimes in the DSGE model.
The presumption behind performing counterfactual simulations in structural VARs is, in contrast,
that switching the estimated interest rate equations should provide a reasonable approximation to
the (correct) switch between the parameters of the monetary policy rule in the underlying
structural model. The ￿ndings of Section 5.2, however, shows that this presumption may be
fallacious. The important implication of our simple example is that the results obtained by
switching the monetary rules in estimated VARs may carry little or no information for the effects
of switching the monetary rules in the underlying macroeconomic models.
7 Conclusions
Vector autoregressions are powerful tools for forecasting and describing reduced-form
correlations. If the task at hand, however, is to explain and interpret speci￿c historical episodes,
these methods may prove less successful, and their merits should be assessed on a case-by-case
basis.
Despite being used in many applications, little was known, so far, on the ability of structural VARs
to identify the sources of the Great Moderation. Using a popular model for monetary policy
analysis, we have shown that VARs may fail to capture the role that monetary policy played in
fostering the greater macroeconomic stability of recent years, as they tend to confuse good policy
for good luck.
The implication of our ￿ndings is that some caution should be used when interpreting existing
VAR results. Signi￿cant declines in the estimated VAR innovation variances and reverse ranking
in counterfactual simulations have been interpreted, so far, as evidence in favour of good luck. We
show that these ￿ndings are also consistent with the good policy hypothesis.
Given the recent advances in building methods for likelihood-based estimation and models for
monetary policy analysis, estimating DSGE models in which monetary policy is allowed, but not
required, to be passive has the potential to discriminate between the good policy and good luck
explanations of the Great Moderation.
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26Table 1 - Testing for stability in the VAR equations:
bootstrapped p-values for the Wald testsa
Shift from passive Shift within
to active policy: the active regime:
Innovation Innovation
Equation: variance Coef￿cients variance Coef￿cients
in￿ation 0.00 [.00; .01] 0.51 [.04; .95] 0.00 [.00; .01] 0.50 [.04; .95]
output gap 0.00 [.00; .00] 0.25 [.01; .82] 0.00 [.00; .02] 0.42 [.03; .95]
interest rate 0.34 [.14; .92] 0.06 [.00; .72] 0.16 [.00; .84] 0.24 [.00; .87]
a Medians and 90% percentiles of the p-values distributions. 1,000 replications
Table 2 - Standard deviations of the simulated series:
counterfactual simulations (reduced-form)a
Interest rate In￿ation Output gap
Passive regime:
baseline 4.33 [3.05; 5.99] 6.48 [5.19; 8.18] 7.05 [5.61; 9.08]
with active regime shocks 2.99 [2.16; 4.54] 3.95 [3.09; 5.70] 4.85 [2.99; 7.63]
Active regime:
baseline 3.80 [2.62; 5.47] 4.20 [3.24; 5.61] 4.80 [3.42; 6.78]
with passive regime shocks 5.69 [3.59; 9.18] 6.20 [4.96; 8.56] 6.70 [5.47; 9.34]
a Median and 90% percentiles of the distributions. 10,000 replications
27-0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
(a) VAR total prediction variance
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
(b) Volatility of innovation in interest rate equation
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
(c) Volatility of innovation in inflation equation
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40





Chart 1: Distributions of the VAR estimated total prediction variance, and of the estimated
variances of VAR innovations: passive and active regimes
28Chart 2: Distributions of the R2 in the regressions of ‘true’ interest rate, in￿ation and output
gap series on the counterfactual series. Counterfactual simulations are based on the struc-
tural VARs and the DSGE model.
29Chart 3: Distributions of the standard deviations of the interest rate, in￿ation, and the output
gap: ‘true’ and counterfactual simulations
30Chart 4: Estimated impulse-response functions to a unitary monetary shock based on sign
restrictions
31